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Trust-Based Runtime Monitoring 
of Distributed Component-Structured 
E-Commerce Software








♦ Trust Management Support



















































z Contractually specified 
interfaces






♦ CORBA component model


















♦ Security objectives of distributed 
and mobile code systems
♦ New security objectives due to 
large number of principals:
z Protection of an application 
with respect to component 
attacks (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability,...)
z Protection of an application 
against a wrong coupling of 
components
z Protection of component 
vendors against wrong 
incriminations
z Trust management











♦ Component contracts contain 
descriptions of security aspects
Model of legal interface actions
♦ Component in question is 
wrapped by an adapter
Interface traffic via adapter only
♦ Observer checks actual behavior 
against contract models
z Adapter reports interface traffic 
z Observer checks interface event 
for compliance with the model 
z If an event is wrong,
» the component is blocked 
» the application 
administrator is notified
Adapter











process dfh2(SellerAdr : Any)
var S : set of SellerAdr ;
init ≡ S = { } ;
actions
DirOfS_read(sell : set of SellerAdr) ≡ S‘ = sell ;
IfToS_ReqTender(Saddr : SellerAdr) ≡




♦ Based on TLA
♦ State-Transition-
Systems
♦ Coupling by syn-




always only if after reading
S=DirOfS.read()
Saddr is member of the set S
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Component Contract Policy Patterns:
♦ Confidentiality:
z Restriction of data flow
z Deterministic behavior to prevent 
hidden channels
♦ Integrity:
z Constraining of interface events 
and their arguments
♦ Availability:
z Minimum waiting times to 
prevent denial-of-service attacks
z Maximum waiting times to 
prevent blocking of components
♦ Non-repudiation:
z Logging of events at a trusted 
third party service
Runtime Auditing
» Data flow access
» Data flow history
» Hidden channel functional 
dependency
» Hidden channel enabling 
history
» Hidden channel exec. time
» Integrity enabling condition
» Integrity enabling history
» Denial-of-service minimum 
waiting time
» Denial-of-service enabling 
history
» Blocking maximum waiting 
time
» Blocking enabling history
» Event logging












♦ Collects good and bad 
evaluations on a component





♦ Varies enforcement depending on 
the current trust value:
z Full observation
z Spot checks 
z Remove wrapper
♦ Causes sealing of a component 
after an alarm message 
♦ Replies inquiries from the Trust 
Information Service
♦ Notifies the Trust Information 
Service about severe violations
Trust
Manager









b + d + u = 1











♦ Trust value determination
z Calculation from the number of
» positive experiences p
» negative experiences n















» Jøsang, Knapskog:       
liberal philosophy












» Beth, Borcherding, Klein: 
unforgiving philosophy












z Component trust values
z Recommendation trust 
values of component users




z Experience reports are 
checked for validity
User’s trust value
z Component trust values are 
computed by means of the 
subjective logic
♦ Application:
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E-Procurement Application Example
Application:
♦ Commodity management 
of fast-food restaurants
♦ OBI (Open Buying on  
the Internet)




z Restaurant, Counting 
Stock, Catalog, Sellers 
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E-Procurement Application Example
































3. Receive tenders from 
sellers
4.2
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♦ Availability (4 policies):
z Preventing denial-of-service 
attacks by demanding minimum 
waiting times between calls
z Guaranteeing contemporary 
orders by demanding maximum 
waiting times for relevant steps
♦ Non-repudiation (1 policy):
z Logging tender requests, tenders, 





13 policies based on the patterns:
♦ Confidentiality (4 policies):
z Relevant information is only 
forwarded to appropriate sellers
z Hidden channels are not used to 
send competitor’s tenders
♦ Integrity (4 policies):
z Relevant variables of the 
environment components are not 
altered
z All selling organizations have a 
fair chance to win the order
z The ordered amount is sensible
















♦ Application security policy:
z Highest security level:     
always full observation
z Medium security level:     
Metric of Beth et al.;              
» spot checks: b > 0,9999    
(7000 positive reports)  
» wrapper removed:               
b > 0,99999              
(11600 positive reports)
z Lowest security level:      
Metric of Jøsang, Knapskog; 
» spot checks: b > 0,99        
(p ≥ 100 · n)
» wrapper removed:              
b > 0,999 (p ≥ 1000 · n)
Adapter
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♦ Availability (4 policies):
z Preventing denial-of-service 
attacks by demanding minimum 
waiting times between calls
z Guaranteeing contemporary 
orders by demanding maximum 
waiting times for relevant steps
♦ Non-repudiation (1 policy):
z Logging tender requests, tenders, 
and orders at the logging service
Runtime overhead:
♦ 5.4 % by run-time enforcement






13 policies based on the patterns:
♦ Confidentiality (4 policies):
z Relevant information is only 
forwarded to appropriate sellers
z Hidden channels are not used to 
send competitor’s tenders
♦ Integrity (4 policies):
z Relevant variables of the 
environment components are not 
altered
z All selling organizations have a 
fair chance to win the order
z The ordered amount is sensible
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Concluding Remarks
Introduced:
♦ Runtime auditing of components 
♦ Trust management support
Other Application of Component 
Contract Models:
♦ Formal Verification at design time 






z UML models instead of cTLA
♦ Trust management support:
z System risk analysis to define 
wrapper enforcement policies
Application
Appli-
cation
Owner
Com-
ponent
Vendor
Trust
Compo-
nent
Contract
ModelsContract
ModelsContract
Models
checked
by 
security
wrapper
System
Models
(e.g., RBAC,
Info Flow)
Formal
Deduction
Control
